Extracorporeal Embryos and the Abortion Debate by Robertson, John A.
Journal of Contemporary Health Law & Policy (1985-2015) 
Volume 2 Issue 1 Article 8 
1986 
Extracorporeal Embryos and the Abortion Debate 
John A. Robertson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/jchlp 
Recommended Citation 
John A. Robertson, Extracorporeal Embryos and the Abortion Debate, 2 J. Contemp. Health L. & Pol'y 53 
(1986). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/jchlp/vol2/iss1/8 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Journal of Contemporary Health Law & Policy (1985-2015) by an authorized editor of CUA Law 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
EXTRACORPOREAL EMBRYOS AND THE
ABORTION DEBATE
John A. Robertson*
Heraclitus said that you can never step into the same river twice. He
might have said the same thing about certain public issues. They do not
move as fast as rivers, but when you dip into them at later points in time, the
look and feel of the controversy often is different, even if core value positions
remain entrenched.
Take the abortion controversy. The debate rages with the same passionate
intensity that has marked the thirteen years since Roe v. Wade. ' Yet there
are differences; a hardening here, a loosening there, and a deepening of the
context as new data emerges. A few years ago the debate centered on the
human life amendment.2 Last year it was the film, The Silent Scream. Now
it shifts to the chance of appointing two justices to the Supreme Court who
will vote with the three dissenting judges in City of Akron v. Akron Repro-
ductive Center3 to reverse Roe v. Wade. In the meantime, Solicitor General
Charles Fried's filing of an amicus brief in an abortion case that does not
directly challenge Roe becomes a newsworthy event as a lightning rod of
Reagan administration thinking on the subject.4
Technological changes may also alter public controversies, and are likely
to do so with abortion. Indeed, technological determinism was built into the
very heart of Roe v. Wade, when the line defining when abortions could be
prohibited was fixed at viability, a point that shifts with technological ad-
vances in neonatology.5 Technological developments at the other end of the
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1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. J. Robertson, Medicolegal Implications of a Human Life Amendment, in DEFINING
HUMAN LIFE: MEDICAL, LEGAL, AND ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS 161 (Shaw and Doudera eds.
1983).
3. 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
4. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 105 S. Ct. 2015
(1985); Diamond v. Charles, 105 S. Ct. 2356 (1985) (companion case).
5. Viability was defined in Roe v. Wade as "the ability to exist outside of the mother,
albeit with artificial aid." 410 U.S. at 153. As John Ely reminds us, this is a definition based
54 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 2:53
spectrum might also affect the abortion controversy by influencing or affect-
ing how we regard the fetus and the interests of the pregnant woman. I am
referring here to developments in in vitro fertilization (IVF) and embryo
transfer that now force us to confront directly the moral and legal status of
the extracorporeal human embryo.
The ability to fertilize human eggs extracorporeally and transfer them af-
ter several cleavages to a physiologically receptive uterus raises issues that
should reflect directly on the abortion debate. It is also an important policy
area in its own right. I would like to report on recent developments with
extracorporeal embryos and discuss issues of rights and duties toward em-
bryos. Examination of the the moral and legal status of the extracorporeal
embryo might cast some light on the abortion debate and prevent it from
contaminating the policy questions that arise with IVF.
IVF TECHNOLOGY AND THE ABORTION DEBATE
Given the media blitz that has covered each step of the way, a person
would have had to be unconscious not to be aware of important develop-
ments in recent years with "test-tube babies" or IVF. As a result of long
research, physicians can now successfully stimulate a woman's ovaries, re-
trieve several eggs, fertilize them in a Petri dish, and transfer them after the
fertilized egg has divided several times, to a physiologically receptive uterus,
usually of the woman providing the egg.'
Since the first birth in 1978, over 2000 children have been born worldwide
as a result of IVF. As work, career, marriage and sexual practices change,
the rate of infertility among middle-class women has increased, creating
great demand for infertility treatments. The IVF industry is now booming
and is likely to grow as infertility rates increase and new extracorporeal vari-
ations arise. There are over 120 IVF programs presently in the U.S., includ-
ing programs in smaller cities without tertiary medical care. Interestingly,
most programs have not yet had a pregnancy and even the best programs
have less than a twenty percent success rate per laparoscopy cycle.
IVF raises a host of troubling issues, some of which derive from the prac-
tices to which it might lead. Routine freezing and thawing of fertilized eggs,
which would suspend embryo development indefinitely, are likely to be of-
fered soon in many IVF programs. Novel collaborative arrangements in-
volving egg, sperm and embryo donors and gestational surrogates are also
on technological advance, rather than a syllogism supporting the drawing of the line at this
point.
6. Grobstein, External Human Fertilization: An Evaluation of Policy, 222 SCIENCE 127
(1983).
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possible. The fertilized egg could be transferred to any physiologically re-
ceptive uterus, and may be gestated by a woman who does not provide the
egg. The gestating woman could then rear the child, transfer the child to the
embryo donor for rearing, or have a third party rear it. Other variations are
possible, as is the possibility of identifying and then altering the genes of the
embryos, which could affect offspring and later generations.
External or extracorporeal conception raises novel issues in several areas
that are just now receiving attention. The questions raised concern issues of
procreative liberty, the status of embryos, the welfare of offspring, effects on
the parties, impact on the family and the reproductive roles of women, and
on the moral tone of the community generally." I want to focus on the ques-
tion of embryo status and relate it to views about the fetus in the abortion
controversy, touching only tangentially on the other issues raised by IVF.
The question of the legal and moral status of the extracorporeal embryo is
novel. Since the pre-implantation embryo has not previously been accessi-
ble, there has been little occasion to consider its moral and legal status. But
now the embryo lies before the gaze of the physiologist or doctor, slowly
dividing in a Petri dish. The decisions made about it can have great signifi-
cance for many people. It can be destroyed, transferred, stored, manipulated
or used in research. What limits if any should there be on what can be done
with it? Who controls or owns it? What may they do with it? These ques-
tions are novel and arise at a time when practices and rituals concerning
treatment of the extracorporeal embryo are still nascent. The time is at hand
to begin the process of value clarification and value choice that will lead to a
set of norms or ethics for decisions concerning extracorporeal embryos.
In thinking about the moral and legal status of the extracorporeal embryo,
we must be careful to distinguish our views about abortion. The two often
get confused, which ends up muddying each issue. One's views about the
extracorporeal embryo tend commonly to track one's views on abortion. A
uniform moral status for prenatal life from the moment of conception
through birth has often been assumed by right-to-life and pro-choice groups
alike. For example, anti-abortionists often take the position that all stages of
prenatal life are of equivalent value and should be treated equivalently. If
the fetus is to be protected, because it is living and human, they automati-
cally assume that all earlier stages of development, including the stage be-
tween fertilization and implantation, must also be protected.
People who are pro-choice also seem to attach the same evaluation to all
postconception prenatal stages. Since they view the woman's interest in
7. These issues are discussed in J. ROBERTSON, PROCREATIVE LIBERTY AND THE Ex-
TRACORPOREAL EMBRYO (forthcoming 1986).
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avoiding pregnancy to be paramount over the interest of the fetus, they as-
sume that the woman's choice would also be paramount over the ex-
tracorporeal embryo, even though it is not located within her body. The
tenacious rigidity of views on either side, in which the yielding of an inch is
fought like the Battle of the Marne, is matched only by lobbyists for the
tobacco industry and the National Rifle Association.
The blurring of views about abortion and the extracorporeal embryo is no
longer tenable now that embryos are accessible extracorporeally. Ex-
tracorporeal embryos created by IVF show important differences from the
first or second trimester fetus threatened with abortion. The embryo is but a
few cells, with very slight chance of implanting and coming to term even if
transferred to the uterus. The fetus is much more complex physiologically,
and much more likely to yield a live birth. It has successfully attached to the
walls of the uterus, and undergone a whole range of complicated develop-
mental sequences. It is considerably more advanced in structure, size, form,
organ and nervous system, and at some point in the mid- or late second
trimester might even become sentient.
Another important difference between embryos and fetuses is location.
The extracorporeal embryo is not situated within the woman's body, making
demands on her physiology. The fetus, however, is attached and growing
within her body, instigating other changes, and at some point requiring re-
moval with the attendant consequences, if a live birth occurs, of childrearing
or relinquishment. The woman's interest in controlling the fetus within her
is much greater than her interest in controlling an extracorporeal embryo
that she does not wish transferred to her uterus.
These differences in development and location make it logically possible to
be in favor of embryo destruction, but find abortion wrong because of the
more advanced developmental stage of the fetus. By the same token, a per-
son could agree that a woman should have a right to terminate a pregancy,
but not award her control over an extracorporeal embryo that she does not
wish transferred to her.
Consideration of the moral and legal status of the extracorporeal embryo
is not the sword that will cut the Gordian knot of the abortion debate. Yet
the extracorporeal embryo may loosen a few of the stays of the more rigidify-
ing arguments and over time lead to more discriminating positions. As more
refined distinctions are made, differences may narrow and some areas of
agreement may even emerge.
In any event, consideration of embryo status is essential if we are to think
clearly about and adopt appropriate policies concerning IVF and embryo
manipulation. For there is a danger that the abortion debate will contami-
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nate thinking and policy about the very different issues that arise with ex-
tracorporeal embryos. One's views about fetuses located within a woman's
body are not sufficient to determine what decisions are appropriate regarding
preimplantation embryos that exist in a laboratory. The following discus-
sion examines more closely the physiological status of embryos and attempts
to identify the moral and legal status that should be assigned them.
EARLY EMBRYONIC DEVELOPMENT
To assign a moral and legal status to the extracorporeal embryo, we must
first examine the facts of early embryo development. Extracorporeal em-
bryos are created as a result of stimulating a woman's ovaries with drugs
such as pergonal, removing one or more eggs before ovulation usually by
laparoscopy under general anesthesia, and then inseminating the eggs that
have been obtained in a Petri dish with husband or donor sperm. Fertiliza-
tion can be detected by the emergence of pronuclei in the inseminated egg
and subsequent cleavage. In the forty-eight to seventy-two hours between
insemination and transfer to the egg source's uterus, the fertilized egg may
divide several times, into four, six or even eight cell masses.
What can we say biologically about a four- or eight-celled fertilized egg
just prior to transfer (this is the stage at which freezing and embryo biopsy is
likely to occur)? Clearly it has the potential, if transferred to a uterus, to
implant and come to term. A new person will then come into existence.
However, a very complicated developmental sequence must occur if the
embryo is to implant in the walls of the uterus and begin a pregnancy. Suc-
cessive cleavages or cell divisions, first into a morula stage, and then into a
blastocyst, must occur. At these stages the individual cells are called blasto-
meres. They become increasingly adherent and closely packed as they pass
into the morula and then blastocyst stage. As they continue to increase,
some become established as a surface layer, surrounding others within, that
develops into the placenta. The cells within become the embryo proper,
which emerges only after implantation occurs some ten to fourteen days af-
ter fertilization.'
Clifford Grobstein describes the developmental process in the blastocyst
stage as follows:
The outer cells are now changing in properties toward trophoblast
(feeding layer), destined to be extra-embryonic (placental) rather
than embryonic in their eventual role. ...
It is the outer population which is clearly exchanging and increas-
8. Grobstein, The Early Development of Human Embryos, 10 J. OF MED. AND PHIL. 213
(1985).
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ingly moving out into the surrounding maternal tissue, thereby
opening up blood-filled spaces for nutritional exchange. Thus the
first cellular differentiation of the new generation is to ensure phys-
iological interaction between offspring and mother.
It is not until the blastocyst is well-established in the uterine wall
(early in the second post-ferilization week) that the inner cell mass
reorganizes into two layers that together make up the embryonic
disc. This first true rudiment of the embryo is the site of the for-
mation of the embryonic axis, simultaneously with the appearance
of a third cell layer between the first two. With this step, so far as
known, the embryonic disc is committed to forming a single indi-
vidual-beyond this point twinning is not believed to occur, either
naturally or experimentally.
. . .the information strongly suggests that early events in mamma-
lian development, very likely including human, relate more to the
formation of extra-embryonic rather than embryonic structures
and functions. This is not surprising since the commitment of
mammals to internal gestation requires effective physiologic inter-
action between offspring and mother very early in development. In
consequence, the first developmental steps do not establish an em-
bryo, but a feeding layer or trophoblast. The trophoblast has al-
ready begun to function before an embryonic rudiment is
demonstrable.
Accordingly, the zygote, cleavage stages and early blastocyst may
be regarded not as embryonic stages but as pre-embryonic stages
(sometimes referred to as the conceptus). This terminology
reserves the term embryo for the rudiments of the whole individual
that appears in the second week after fertilization.
. . .Developmental individuality in the sense of singleness is not
established until an embryonic axis is formed, an event that
roughly corresponds to the time of implantation and initiation of
physiological changes of pregnancy in the mother.9
To summarize, the extracorporeal embryo is a living human entity of a
few nondifferentiated cells that has the potential, if transferred to a uterus, to
attach and eventually produce a live birth. Unlike a fetus, however, the ex-
tracorporeal embryo has no organs, no neuromuscular structure or spinal
column. Indeed, it will first develop a trophoblastic or placental layer before
the embryo proper that could develop into an individual is formed. Not
until ten to fourteen days after fertilization will the most rudimentary of all
embryo structures emerge-the embryonic disc out of which the embryonic
axis and spinal column will eventually, if development continues, emerge.
9. Report of the Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society, The Status of Em-
bryos (1985) (to be published).
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Only later will an organ, neuromuscular and nervous system develop. At
some later point the capacity for sentience will also emerge. Wherever we
place the point of sentience in the fetus, it is clear that the external, pre-
implantation embryo (or pre-embryo, to be accurate) has no differentiated
organ structure, and has not even developed the rudimentary structure of
the embryo itself, which develops after implantation in the uterine wall
occurs.
Now clearly the pre-embryo is a genetically unique, living human entity.
It has the potential if certain other conditions and events occur to develop
into a fully sentient person. However, the chances of any one embryo im-
planting after transfer and coming to term are quite low, considerably less
than ten percent. At this point it is not sentient, it does not feel pain, it is not
conscious, and there is no ability to interact. While people might choose to
treat the embryo as an object of respect, it clearly is not a person in the usual
sense that we use the term person, for it does not even have differentiated
organs, much less a developed brain and nervous system which persons ordi-
narily have.
The pre-implantation embryo is similar to blood, bone marrow and other
tissue or even solid organs, though there are important differences. Both
tissue, such as bone marrow, and embryos are living and human. They both
have the potential to enable another person to live, indeed, bone marrow and
solid organs have a higher potential for doing so than the pre-embryo. The
chief difference between them is that successful transfer of the embryo could
produce a new person, while successful transfer of solid organs and tissues
will allow an already existing person to continue to live. That difference
suggests that there is a greater obligation to transfer transplantable tissue
and organs than there is to transfer an embryo to a uterus, because of our
greater duties to existing rather than to potential persons. Indeed, the homi-
cide laws would classify knowing destruction of transplantable organs and
tissues in certain circumstances as murder."0 Embryo destruction in no cir-
cumstances could be murder.
MORAL AND LEGAL STATUS OF THE EXTRACORPOREAL PRE-EMBRYO
Does the potential to become a person confer a particular moral and legal
status on the embryo, a status that entails duties that limit what might be
done with extracorporeal embryos?
I argue that the embryo does not have a moral status in and of itself, as it
presently is, but does have moral status if it might be transferred to a uterus
10. This action would constitute murder if it were done to intentionally cause the death of
a person who would have lived if the organ or tissue had been transplanted in them.
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and thus become a person. When transfer does not occur and no duty is
owed, decisions about embryos become occasions to use embryos as a sym-
bol of life or persons generally. The need for such a symbol must be weighed
against the costs to autonomy or future knowledge that symbol-making nec-
essarily involves.
1. Transfer to Uterus Intended
Let's first take the case where the embryo will be transferred to a uterus.
This is the usual situation now with IVF as an infertility treatment and is the
most common practice. Embryo storage techniques, which are on the verge
of being routinely practiced, would also be undertaken with the intent of
transferring the embryos to a uterus.
The intent or possibility that the embryo will be transferred to a uterus
necessarily confers a special moral and legal status upon it. What is done to
it necessarily risks affecting the person who is born as a result. Respect for
persons requires that we respect them by our actions and omissions before
they are born as well as after. Thus, we should refrain from actions that are
reasonably foreseeable as likely to produce harm, if healthy offspring could
otherwise be born.
There is a well-developed tradition both in criminal and civil law that
recognizes prenatal torts and obligations to avoid prenatal injury to people."
If one is going to do something that will affect someone who is not yet in
being but who is likely to come into being, one has an obligation to avoid
harm to such a person. This duty is legally enforceable in tort and criminal
law only when the person injured by the action has been born. The condi-
tional nature of the duty, however, still has a great deterrent effect, for peo-
ple will avoid actions that could harm potential offspring. An example of
such a conditional duty to future persons, who can enforce it only if they
actually are born, are the legal questions that have arisen around prenatal
fetal surgery and fetal therapy, currently a much debated topic in
obstetrics. 12
This body of law would clearly apply to actions regarding embryos that
might be transferred to a uterus. Such choices could affect the welfare of
future persons in significant ways, and therefore should be made with care.
Indeed, the development of IVF has been sensitive to this risk. At a certain
point physicians have been willing to run risks that others would not, but
11. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy and Child-
birth, 69 VA. L. REV. 405, 437-42 (1983).
12. Robertson, Legal Issues in Fetal Therapy, 9 SEMINARS IN PERINATOLOGY 136-42
(1985).
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they would not have gotten very far if the risk of defective births was very
high. As far as is known, IVF and the whole process of extracorporeal con-
ception and early development do not appear to have a higher rate of con-
genital defects than does coital reproduction.'
3
A higher rate of handicaps would doubtlessly affect the willingness of peo-
ple to use IVF, but it would not necessarily mean that those persons who
were willing to take the risk of defects would be wronging the offspring or be
accountable to them for their existence. A central feature of the IVF situa-
tion is that absent IVF there is no way for the child to be born undamaged.
If offspring are to be born, they must run the risk of damage because IVF,
the procedure posing the risk, also makes the birth of the person possible.
However, risking a damaged child by noncoital means, even when an un-
damaging alternative is not possible, could harm those persons who end up
bearing the costs of rearing handicapped offspring. Reproductive responsi-
bility in the face of risks of unavoidably handicapped offspring is thus a ques-
tion of avoiding harm to others rather than to the offspring, since the
offspring cannot be born without the damage that is of concern.
These distinctions must be remembered in considering future develop-
ments such as embryo freezing, research, and donation. Even if embryo
freezing and thawing were more likely to cause damaged offspring, running
the risk would not wrong offspring born after storage. If freezing does not
occur, the damaged person would never come into being. Similarly, transfer
of embryos that have been the object of research may also be justified on this
ground, for absent the research, they might never have been transferred and
thus had the chance to become persons.
Finally, the use of gamete donors and surrogates cannot be said to wrong
offspring, since there is no way for those offspring to be born absent the
collaborative arrangement that raises concerns about offspring welfare. The
use of donors and surrogates raises potential conflicts between procreative
liberty and the welfare of offspring. Since the interests of offspring are at
stake, the right of the participants to enter into enforceable reproductive
contracts that assign rearing rights and duties in offspring is at issue. 4 In
considering the effect of donors and surrogates on offspring, we must re-
member that without the donor or surrogate the offspring would never have
been born. Regulation of procreative contracts must confront this fact;
otherwise there will be no offspring to protect.
13. Grobstein, supra note 6, at 127.
14. ROBERTSON, supra note 7.
1986]
62 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 2:53
2. Nontransfer of Extracorporeal Embryos
A different set of issues arises if no transfer of the extracorporeal embryo
to a uterus will occur. In that case there is no possiblity of harm to others,
since no person will result from that embryo. This raises the question of
whether the embryo itself has rights or interests that need protection. If it
does not, under what circumstances might people choose to protect it as a
symbol of life or persons generally? These issues arise in the context of deci-
sions about nontransfer or destruction of embryos, and whether nontrans-
ferred embryos may be used for research.
A. Obligation to Transfer or Option to Destroy?
All IVF programs and all persons undergoing IVF must confront the
question of nontransfer of embryos. The practice in most IVF programs is
to transfer all embryos to a uterus. Some programs adopt this policy to
avoid controversy with right-to-life groups. Others choose it to assure the
greatest possibility of pregnancy. Some persons may also believe it to be the
morally correct action. However, most programs will not require transfer of
polyspermic eggs, since there is no chance that a healthy child will be born.
The question of nontransfer could arise in several situations even with
healthy eggs. If more than four or five embryos have been created, transfer
of all creates an undue hazard of multiple gestation. Patients and physicians
might not wish to run that risk. Many programs avoid the dilemma by not
fertilizing all eggs retrieved and by limiting the number of eggs removed.
However, the number of transferrable embryos might not always be so easily
controlled, thus raising the issue of nontransfer of the excess.
Embryo transfer might become impossible for other reasons. In the forty-
eight to seventy-two hours between laparoscopy to remove the eggs and
transfer to the uterus, some women will die, get sick or change their minds.
The greatest pressure to avoid transfer will arise after embryo storage be-
comes routine. Couples who stored excess embryos for use in later cycles
may find that their reproductive plans no longer require them. They may
refuse donation to avoid the possibility of the embryo becoming a biological
descendant, consenting to the "removal from storage" which will lead to the
death of the embryo."5 The ability to diagnose the genetic makeup of pre-
embryos will also lead to decisions against transfer, and embryos used in
15. This term is used euphemistically to refer to destruction of stored embryos in the
Waller Report from the state of Victoria in Australia. See THE COMMITrEE TO CONSIDER
THE SOCIAL, ETHICAL AND LEGAL IssuEs ARISING FROM IN VITRO FERTILIZATION, Report
on the Disposition of Embryos Produced by In Vitro Fertilization (1984).
Extracorporeal Embryos
research may also be destroyed to avoid risk of producing congenital defects
in offspring.
Is it morally wrong not to transfer a healthy embryo to a uterus? Is there
a legal or moral duty to do so, so that they might realize their potential to
become persons? Or is there a right to order destruction, to prevent that
potential person from being born? Absent a moral or legal duty to transfer,
are there good reasons for adopting mandatory transfer policies?
1. No Duty to Transfer Embryos
It is clear that there is no obligation to transfer embryos based on obliga-
tions to the persons who might then be born. Future persons have no claim
on us unless our present choices will affect their well-being when they do
come into being. If they never come into being, they have not been harmed,
since no person has ever existed to be harmed. Thus there is no obligation to
the person who might come into being as a result of transfer, becau e there is
no such person. No person exists to whom an obligation can be owed. A
view that we are obligated to bring all potential persons into being would
prohibit contraception and make overpopulation a duty to those involved in
the resulting Malthusian struggle for survival. Menstruation and nocturnal
emissions should then be marked by funerals for the person or persons who
were prevented from being born. Onanism would amount to homicide
(making Onan's punishment more fitting).
Nor is there an obligation to the embryo in and of itself to be transferred,
so that it might have the chance of realizing its potential personhood. To
say there is such a duty would be to assume that the nontransferred pre-
embryo is a rights-bearing entity in and of itself. It might become such an
entity if certain favorable conditions and events occur. But the potential to
become a person does not mean that an entity should be treated as a person
now, anymore than an acorn's potential to become an oak tree means that it
now be regarded as an oak tree. (Of course, it may be valued because of this
potential, but that is a different basis for value than when it has attained its
potential.)
Indeed, such treatment would be very difficult in light of the biology of the
embryo. As we have seen, it has not even reached the trophoblast or placen-
tal stage that is necessary for pregnancy and the embryo proper to emerge.
There is no cognition. There is no rationality. There is no consciousness.
There is no ability to interact with others. There is no ability to feel pain.
There is not even an organ structure or a nervous system. There is a geneti-
cally unique entity that might develop those traits and thus have claims on
us. But it is not meaningful to speak of a four-celled entity that is not yet
1986]
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differentiated between placenta and embryo proper as possessing rights by
virtue of its present state, regardless of its potential to become a new person.
A refusal to transfer a healthy embryo to a physiologically receptive
uterus is not an injustice to the embryo (nor to the person who will never
exist) because nothing is owed to the embryo (or to that potential person). It
has no interests, and thus cannot be the subject of moral duties at this rudi-
mentary stage, even if it could become the subject of duties at some later
point in time. Moreover, the precise point in time at which an implanted
embryo or fetus becomes such an entity need not be resolved. However lib-
erally we construe sentience in the fetus and assign duties as a result, the pre-
embryo has many developmental miles to go before it feels and thus deserves
similar treatment.
The law reflects such an analysis. Nontransfer or active destruction of
extracorporeal embryos would not constitute homicide. (Nor would it con-
stitute abortion, since implantation has not yet occurred). Legal personhood
starts upon live separation from the mother after gestation sufficient for via-
bility has occurred.16 If the embryo is not going to be transferred, the rele-
vant legal issue is who has dispositional authority and what limits are placed
on the use of nontransferred embryos. A person who wrongfully prevented
the transfer of a couple's embryo (intentionally or negligently causing a
meltdown in the frozen embryo facility) would not be liable for wrongful
death of the embryo, but for interference with a person's right to control
disposition.
Although the extracorporeal pre-embryo is not owed anything in its own
right, and justice is not implicated unless a person's dispositional rights over
the embryo are violated, the embryo could still be treated with respect as a
symbol of life and persons generally. The embryo itself is owed nothing as a
matter of justice, but because of its potential it may still serve as a symbol of
persons generally. Indeed, it will be a powerful symbol of human life and
personhood (after all, it is human, living, and has the potential to become a
person), in the same way that a heart or liver or kidney that could be trans-
planted to another is a symbol of the importance of life and persons. These
living human cells do have a significance and potential that other cells do
not, and might properly be treated as objects of respect.
Let us explore a bit further what such symbolizing might entail. Non-
transfer of the embryo does not harm a person as would waste or discard of
the solid organ. An identifiable other person is not harmed, as would occur
if the heart were destroyed rather than transplanted into a 30 year old pa-
tient with end stage cardiac disease. The concern is not merely to avoid
16. Commonwealth v. Edelin, 371 Mass. 497, 359 N.E.2d 4 (1976).
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actively killing human life, since active destruction of the embryo is not nec-
essary. The embryo equivalent of a "do not resuscitate order" can be writ-
ten, and the fertilized egg kept in culture until it stops dividing and dies.
Although no wrong is done the embryo or potential person by nontrans-
fer, it nevertheless is an occasion to demonstrate respect for life. A policy of
transferring in all or nearly all cases, and limiting how and when disposal of
the nontransferred embryo might occur (to mark its difference from blood,
urine and other human tissue and fluids) might then make sense and be cho-
sen by many people.
2. Mandatory Embryo Donation Laws
Physicians and patients are certainly free to adopt policies or practices
regarding the transfer of all embryos, to the extent that they have disposi-
tional control over the gametes, embryos or services at issue. They may
choose to do only certain procedures or none at all and hire or serve only
those persons who share their views. As IVF spreads and right-to-life
groups get involved, some persons might argue that a law should be passed
to assure that all embryos are transferred. Would a law that mandated
transfer of all extracorporeal embryos to a willing recipient be
constitutional?
The answer depends on the right of persons to avoid having biological
descendants, a question not settled by recognizing the pregnant woman's
right to abort a fetus. The question of embryo destruction is clearly different
from the question of fetal destruction that occurs in abortion. A law man-
dating transfer of the embryo anonymously to a willing recipient would re-
spect a woman's right not to be pregnant. Instead, the question is whether
the woman (and man providing the sperm) have the right to avoid biological
descendants. Let us assume a completely anonymous mandatory embryo
donation and a foolproof way to prevent any of the parties from learning the
identity of the others. Does a person have such an interest in avoiding anon-
ymous biological descendants that they can prevent transfer of an unwanted
embryo to a willing recipient?
This question forces us to consider an issue that has never had to be faced
so starkly-the meaning of the genetic tie alone, without any of the rearing
rights and duties that are normally entailed. The burden of a mandatory
donation law is the burden of an unwanted genetic tie tout court. No gesta-
tion. No parturition. No rearing. No relinquishment for adoption. No
contact. No identity. No knowledge of the actual child, and vice versa. No
rearing rights and duties. The burden imposed is the knowledge that per-
haps a son or daughter exists, offspring that one will never know.
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The importance of this interest will depend on the meanings that men and
women attach to the genetic tie tout court. One can imagine both intense
interest or disinterest to the point of boredom in the possibility of unknown
offspring. Some people will find that mere biological relationship has great
significance. Some people will fear contact and suffer guilt. Others will
crave contact and suffer because they cannot have it.
The constitutionality of such a law depends upon identifying very pre-
cisely the interests at stake and then making a value judgment about its im-
portance. Even if we cannot predict the value that persons will attach, we
can identify the interests at stake and begin to think about their relation to
other protected values. For example, we do recognize that a person is free to
avoid rearing rights and duties and their psychological entanglements by
avoiding reproduction altogether. Since mandatory embryo donation does
not force people to gestate or rear unwillingly, they would not run afoul of
the constitutionally protected right to contraception and abortion.
Given these distinctions and a Supreme Court reluctant to define new fun-
damental rights, there may be no constitutional barrier to the state enacting
such a law. As we have seen, Roe v. Wade would not prohibit it, since that
decision rests on the woman's interest in avoiding gestation and childrearing
or relinquishment burdens. It is not based on avoidance of the genetic tie
tout court.
Even if a mandatory anonymous embryo donation law were to be found
constitutional, the case for use of the full extent of the state's power over
reproductive choice is not a strong one. The potential burdens to individu-
als, in light of the symbolic benefits, are too great. A donation system that
attempts to be anonymous could still have leakage that might force some
person to deal with unwanted descendants, or lie awake at night fearing (or
hoping) that they will. Given a presumption in favor of individual choice
over the creation of biological descendants, should we not rely on moral
suasion and leave the question of donation of unwanted embryos to the
individual?
B. Research With Nontransferred Embryos
The moral and legal status of the extracorporeal pre-embryo may also
determine when research with embryos may occur. Research followed by
transfer to a uterus is morally and legally problematic because of possible
adverse impact on future offspring. However, research on nontransferred
embryos does not directly affect future offspring. Should embryo research
therefore be permitted? What limits and conditions are justified? This issue
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again raises the question of treating the nontransferred embryo as a symbol
versus treating it as a rights-bearing entity in its own right.
Research on nontransferred embryos could yield useful knowledge in
many areas. Studies of early embryo development could improve infertility
treatments, for example, demonstrating the optimal conditions for embryo
freezing and thawing and leading to micro-injection techniques of fertiliza-
tion for oligospermic males. Experiments in embryo biopsy, in which a blas-
tomere is removed and karyotyped, could lead to better understanding of
genetic disease and pre-implantation gene therapy. No doubt embryo re-
search would yield useful knowledge in other areas as well.
Embryo research has become, however, a matter of controversy and very
little is occurring. A bill banning all embryo research passed the House of
Lords in Britain last year. Fetal research laws in at least six states could
now be read to prohibit embryo research of any sort. 17 Despite the favorable
recommendations of the Ethics Advisory Board in 1979, no human embryo
research is federally funded, and little appears to be going on in the private
sector.' 8 However, the diffusion of IVF will increase the demands for em-
bryo research and no doubt generate controversy.
The opposition to any embryo research is located in rabid right-to-life
groups that view the embryo as an actual person, and who object to embryo
destruction, if not also to IVF. The position that research harms nontrans-
ferred embryos and therefore should never be permitted has been rejected by
several authoritative bodies that have examined the issue. The Ethics Advi-
sory Board in the United States, the British Warnock Committee, the Aus-
tralian Waller Committee and many other groups have agreed that
nontransferred embryos may be used in scientific studies that address impor-
tant questions and undergo some prior review. The risks to symbolic respect
for life are deemed outweighed by the benefits of the knowledge to be
obtained.
This conclusion is well-founded, given what we know of pre-implantation
embryos. A nontransferred embryo cannot be hurt by research any more
than blood or tissue cells can be hurt. The embryo consists of a few cells
that lack the capacity to suffer. It has no nervous system, nor even the rudi-
mentary structures from which the capacity to feel and experience pain
could develop. Using it as an object of research before it dies could not hurt
it, for it lacks interests and thus the capacity to be hurt. Since it is not a
17. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 112 § 12J (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1983); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 22, § 1593 (1980); MicH. COMp. LAWS § 333.2685 to .2692 (1980); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 14-02.2-01 to -02 (1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-54-1 (supp. 1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-
310 (1978).
18. 44 Fed. Reg. 35,033-58 (1979).
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moral or rights-bearing entity in its own right, research cannot harm or
wrong it.
The question of doing embryo research is a trade-off between symbolizing
respect for life and persons generally and the benefits of the knowledge to be
obtained. For most people the question is not difficult, because little seems
to be gained from banning all embryo research, including well-designed sci-
entific studies. If embryos are not entities owed moral duties in their own
right, then research on nontransferred embryos does not harm them, for
they have no interests to be harmed. Embryo research would not then vio-
late a Kantian duty not to use other persons merely as a means to one's own
ends. Moreoever, research with persons is not always unethical. We do per-
mit the use of incompetent subjects, including fetuses, as objects of re-
search-as mere means if you will-when the research does not harm
them."9 However we characterize nontransferred embryos, it is hard to see
how they are harmed by research before they die.
a Length of Time
Let me address briefly two issues that arise once research on nontrans-
ferred embryos is accepted. One issue concerns the length of time that a
nontransferred embryo can be grown in culture for research purposes. The
authoritative bodies that have pronounced on embryo research recommend
that embryos should not be grown in culture beyond fourteen days. This
line is chosen to prevent research on embryos that have developed the em-
bryonic axis, the precursor structure from which the spinal column and
neuroskeletal system will develop. Such a line minimizes the risk that re-
search will harm the embryo itself, on the assumption that harm can occur
once a nervous system or its precursor structures have started to develop.
The fourteen day line has not yet generated problems for researchers,
since there is very little embryo research occurring. However, it should not
be cast in concrete as an inviolable line never to be crossed. This line should
be re-evaluated when the need to research beyond fourteen days arises;
otherwise, the fourteen day limit may come to limit useful research without
good reason, as if harm to the embryo would not arise until much later. If
the line is purely symbolic, then the costs of the line need to be addressed.
b. The Source of Nontransferred Embryos Used in Research
Part of the controversy surrounding embryo research has concerned the
source of the embryos used in research. This issue has great practical im-
19. Current federal regulations, for example, allow research both on fetuses and incompe-
tent subjects under certain circumstances. See generally 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101-211 (1985).
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port, since it is necessary to have embryos in order to conduct embryo re-
search. The debate here concerns whether only spare embryos created in
attempts to relieve infertility may be used or whether embryos may also be
created specifically for research purposes. The question is purely symbolic,
for it arises only if research on nontransferred embryos is permitted and is
independent of the precise research maneuver being undertaken.
If enough spare embryos were created in an IVF treatment cycle, limiting
research to those embryos would not pose practical problems. However, re-
searchers would prefer to be able to create embryos specifically for research
purposes from donated sperm and from eggs donated during a stimulated
IVF cycle or secondary to oophorectomy or hysterectomy. Embryos created
in this way will assure a greater and more easily coordinated supply of re-
search embryos than a supply system limited to embryos leftover from an
IVF treatment cycle.
Although this issue has not yet surfaced in the United States, it generated
a great deal of debate within the Warnock Committee. A majority voted to
allow embryos to be created for research purposes, but there were seven dis-
sents, three of which were based on opposition to embryo research in all
circumstances.2 ° When the supply of embryos for research is limited, as
appears likely, the case for limiting research to spare embryos is not persua-
sive. After all, persons who take this view agree that embryos need not be
transferred and can be used in research. They find that embryo research
itself is justified because there is no harm to the embryo as such and the
symbolic gain of a total ban is outweighed by the loss of knowledge that a
ban would entail.
Since harm to nontransferred embryos used in research is independent of
their origin, the concern about source is purely symbolic. But if symbolic
gain is outweighed by research costs in the case of research on spare em-
bryos, why is it not also outweighed by the research costs that will occur if
embryos cannot be created solely for research purposes? In my view, per-
sons who would permit embryo research but think it should be limited to
excess embryos are drawing inconsistent or arbitrary lines through the sym-
bolic gain from such a restriction. Of course, they might really oppose all
embryo research, regardless of source. But that is a different issue.
Persons and physicians are free to adopt such positions in their personal
dealings with embryos over which they have lawful control. Persons are free
20. WARNOCK COMMITTEE, Report of the Committee of Inquiry Into Human Fertilisation
and Embryology, at 58-70, 90-95 (1984). See THE COMMITTEE TO CONSIDER THE SOCIAL,
ETHICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES ARISING FROM IN VITRO FERTILIZATION, Report on the Dispo-
sition of Embryos Produced by In Vitro Fertilization (1984).
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to refuse to donate egg and sperm to create research embryos, and are free
not to participate in such research themselves. But one's personal views
about the propriety of creating embryos solely for research should not pre-
vent other persons from giving gametes and creating embryos for research
purposes; nor should it restrict federal funding for embryo research.
Consider the comparable situation with fetal research. We might, for ex-
ample, object to a woman who agreed to be impregnated and then aborted
soley to produce fetuses for research purposes. Putting aside the question of
her legal rights to do so, that situation is more extreme in two ways. One is
the developmental differences between embryos and fetuses. Intentionally
conceiving and then aborting a fetus may cause the fetus harm. Intentional
creation of an embryo cannot harm it. The second is that the woman would
be taking on a physiological burden that is absent when embryos are created
from donated sperm and eggs, particularly when egg retrieval is secondary
to other surgery.
CONCLUSION
These are a few of the issues posed by developments in IVF and the ability
to create extracorporeal embryos. I have focused on the moral and legal
status of the extracorporeal embryo because of its intrinsic importance and
because of the light that it sheds on the abortion debate. The discussion
shows the need for careful thinking, based on knowledge of biological facts.
In order to resolve the complex questions that arise concerning the rights
and duties of persons regarding fetuses and embryos, we need to distinguish
between these stages of prenatal development and the debates over abortion
and IVF in which they lie embedded.
